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# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*

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## CRISIS IN EUROPE DEMANDS FURTHER DEFINITION OF U.S. POLICY

THE counteroffensive launched by the Germans on the Western front on December 16 will have had a salutary effect if it arouses the United Nations to the fact that by their bickerings about post-war advantages they are doing their best to save Germany from defeat. So perturbed has public opinion become here and in Britain that if we are to keep our perspective—and our temper—on both sides of the ocean we must bear in mind a few essential points.

1. Two paramount issues are at stake at this stage of the war: the issue of how nations can best achieve security against future aggression, and the issue whether the end of hostilities will usher in restoration of pre-1939 conditions or some kind of a better order. Those who have harped on the need of first winning the war, then talking about the political, economic and social maladjustments that brought it about, have proved consistently wrong. They could have been proved right only if it had been possible to keep the world in a state of suspended animation while military victory was being achieved. Instead, the world has been changing during the war with breath-taking rapidity, and what we face now are not Frankenstein nightmares but changes that could have been anticipated and were, in fact, anticipated by informed observers.

2. Had more attention been paid to these changes by Allied statesmen, the proposals made at Dumbarton Oaks would have been considered long ago, and the skeleton of an international security system, however tentative and imperfect, would have been created by now. In the absence of such an organization, which even at this zero hour is still on paper, every nation is seeking to assure its security as best it can by its own national efforts. What is disturbing about the Anglo-Russian alliance of 1942 and the Franco-Russian alliance of 1944, or about efforts of Britain and Russia to create blocs of "friendly" states in respective spheres of influence, is not that they are

being made, but that there should have been so little else for Britain, France and Russia, not to speak of weaker nations, to hold on to as protection against future German aggression.

3. The saddest feature of the situation is that every attempt by other nations to achieve security as best they can arouses reactions in this country that presage return to isolation—this time the isolation of an armed camp on the alert for danger from any quarter. American disillusionment with Europe is enhanced by dismay that the liberated peoples are not more "grateful" to us, and by fear that war will leave in its wake poverty beyond our strength to alleviate.

4. As a matter of cold realism, there is no reason why the liberated peoples should be "grateful" to the non-European powers—Britain, the United States and Russia. Of the three, Britain alone can be said to have had an interest in the fate of Europe from the outset of the war. The United States and Russia did not become directly concerned until they themselves were attacked in 1941. The best thing we can hope for is that the liberated peoples will feel that we are all fighting a common enemy in a common cause.

5. Right there, however, a fundamental difficulty arises, for after the first hours of jubilation the peoples of Europe have begun to wonder whether we are all, in fact, fighting in a common cause and, if so, how that cause is defined in the United States. It so happens that the elements in the conquered countries who fought the Nazis most bitterly, and thus made a genuine contribution to the military effort of the Allies, are often also elements who favor certain internal changes—moderate reforms in Western Europe, drastic changes from feudalism to twentieth century conditions in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Yet the Allies, in their natural desire for order behind military lines, sometimes tend to repress these elements, which they themselves armed, more vigorously than they do the pro-Fascists.

6. No responsible person favors anarchy behind the military lines of the Allies, and anarchy, where it does exist, is just what the Germans want. But to believe that the return of governments-in-exile acceptable to the great powers will of itself end a revolutionary ferment born of hunger, misery and despair is to misinterpret tragically the temper of Europe. The British, as Mr. Churchill bluntly stated on December 15, are ready to forego the principle of legitimacy in Poland. They do so not because they necessarily prefer the Polish Committee of National Liberation, but because they have agreed to consider Poland as Russia's sphere of influence, and expect Russia will soon use Poland as a more direct route for the invasion of Germany than that offered by Hungary or Czechoslovakia. In Greece, which Russia agreed to regard as within Britain's military sphere, Mr. Churchill is following the opposite course. In neither case has Britain clearly cast its lot on the side of the forces opposing all forms of Fascism—thus causing some anti-Fascists to make common cause with Russia.

But whatever criticisms we may have of the policy of Britain and Russia, those two countries have at least made their political objectives reasonably clear. Mr. Churchill, however, is justified in asking (and doubtless the same question could be asked by Stalin) where the United States stands on these controversial questions. This country cannot be an active participant in military operations, and yet disinterest itself in the political and psychological results of these operations. Our decisions today could turn the tide in Europe both on the issue of security and on internal post-war reforms in liberated countries.

The statement on Poland made by Secretary of State Stettinius on December 18 recognizes that boundary questions (which are in essence security questions) in Europe cannot be postponed until the end of the war, but does not really come to grips with the Russo-Polish controversy. He declared that, "if a mutual agreement is reached by the United Nations directly concerned [regarding the future frontiers of Poland], this Government would have no objection to such an agreement which could make an essential contribution to the prosecution of the war against

## FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES DOMINATE BRITAIN'S POLITICAL SCENE

Despite the vote of confidence on British policy in Greece, which Prime Minister Churchill's coalition government received on December 8, public debate and demonstrations for reversal of that policy continue. These discussions are broader in scope than the Parliamentary hearings on Greece, extending as they do to the policy on Poland, defined by Churchill on December 15, and to the projected Western European bloc. It is important for Americans to understand this restive state of public opinion in Britain, since—admitting the necessity for further definition

the common enemy." The Soviet government, rightly or wrongly, considers that it has made an effort to reach an agreement with former Premier Mikolaczyk of the Polish government-in-exile, but that that government is irrevocably opposed to the cession of Eastern Poland to Russia. By making no reference to the question of who, on behalf of Poland, is to accept the proposed agreement, Mr. Stettinius may give the Polish government-in-exile the hope that it will have the support of the United States, or at least of influential Polish and Catholic groups in this country, for its opposition to Russia. Much as one can sympathize with the tragic plight of the Poles, the fact is that the liberation of Poland from German rule can be effected only by Russia. And if Moscow becomes convinced that there is no hope of settling the matter of Eastern Poland by agreement in the near future, its attitude both on the proposed international security organization and on the future course of the war may be adversely affected. It is the danger of such an eventuality that gave peculiar urgency to Mr. Churchill's December 15 address on Poland.

**IS SITUATION BEYOND HOPE?** Even now a reasoned statement of the differences that may have arisen between the United States and our Allies, of the points on which we agree with them, and the political objectives we are pursuing in Europe, would help immeasurably to clear the atmosphere both at home and abroad. There is urgent need of another Big Three conference. But what we need most of all is continuous consultation about the day-to-day problems that are bound to multiply as the war reaches its climax—a political Combined Board, similar to the Combined Boards on economic problems and the Combined Chiefs of Staff that have mapped out the military strategy of the war. This period of intense crisis could spell either the dissolution of the Allied coalition, or bring about far more intimate collaboration between the United Nations. But machinery alone, no matter how good, will not help. As John Mason Brown has said in *Many a Watchful Night*, the making of the peace will require greater courage, "greater character and characters" than the waging of the war.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

of American policy—it is desirable to frame our policy with full knowledge of all sections of British opinion which, at this juncture, cannot be wholly effective owing to the exigencies of coalition government.

**BRITISH PUBLIC AROUSED.** The vote on Greece might have been predicted, and since that time the annual conference of the Labor party decided on December 11 that its Ministers should remain in the coalition government until the defeat of Germany. But the Labor Conference listened to numerous speeches critical of Churchill's foreign pol-

icies, and many Labor party members both in and out of Parliament subsequently challenged the wisdom of pursuing the type of intervention Britain has undertaken in Greece. Not since the vigorous public demands of 1942 for the opening of a second front in Western Europe has the British public been so aroused. Added to the opposition voiced by prominent Laborites is that of the Dean of Canterbury, the Very Rev. Hewlett Johnson, who has made known that he is irrevocably opposed to the government's course in Greece. Mass meetings in Trafalgar Square, in London, were followed by even larger demonstrations in Scotland on December 18, involving shipyard and aircraft workers.

**ELECTION FORECASTS.** Although cleavages on the various foreign issues now besetting Britain are somewhat contradictory, they reveal for the first time during the life of the wartime coalition government a striking rift on broad terms of foreign policy. Whereas many Conservative party members view the intervention in Greece with equanimity, many Laborites abstained entirely from voting on that matter. On the whole, the positions of the two parties are reversed with respect to Poland. Yet such differences, although not entirely consistent now, will gain in importance when general elections are held at the end of the European war—the more so since the date of the defeat of Germany has been postponed beyond all former prophesies. Meanwhile, foreign affairs will inevitably become increasingly significant in party politics, in contrast to forecasts which assumed that the elections would turn on domestic problems.

Many observers had predicted a favorable vote for Labor candidates in the event that domestic problems dominated the political scene. Now, with the injection of foreign policy into the forthcoming party contest, the question is immediately raised whether this prediction will hold. In view of present objections to the Churchill policies, there is little doubt that in such cases as the Greek intervention the temper and the objective would be greatly changed under a Labor

government. Yet whatever the character of Britain's relations with individual countries where it has vital interests, as in Greece, there is no doubt that all British political groups would agree on the need of assuring their country's security.

**BRITAIN'S SEARCH FOR SECURITY.** While the unilateral and anti-Leftist diplomatic moves recently made by the Churchill government may prove detrimental to our future cooperation with Britain, much of the anti-British feeling that is again emerging in this country may have similar consequences. To avoid misunderstandings, Americans must appreciate the desire for security which has prompted Britain's action in Mediterranean countries and has gradually led the British to hope for the creation of a Western European bloc whereby the English Channel might be safeguarded—through eventual arrangements for air bases, if necessary, in the Low Countries. This problem of security has again been raised by the 20-year Franco-Soviet alliance announced on December 17. Many American observers have jumped to the conclusion that this pact would nullify Britain's efforts, but the British believe that, like their own alliance with Russia, it will aid them in their search for security.

But American understanding of Britain's objectives will not suffice. Britain itself will have to clarify sooner or later its broader aims in such a way that the American public may feel that they are in harmony with the war aims so often proclaimed by the United Nations. The British believe that the chance for Western European unity will be enhanced if Britain and Russia agree on future military measures to prevent the resurgence of Germany. Similarly, the demarcation of spheres of influence in other areas will—they claim—contribute to security only if these spheres are geared into the broader framework of a United Nations organization. If all steps to achieve security have an international organization as their ultimate objective, a real case can be made out for Britain's policy. But as military operations are prolonged, political developments in Europe, which increasingly arouse the sympathy and concern of both the American and British public, demand action on the part of all the great powers in concert. Since the establishment of a broader United Nations organization has been delayed, however, the Allies must make sure that their day-to-day diplomatic decisions are compatible with the projected international security system.

GRANT S. McCLELLAN

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
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# Washington News Letter



## WAR SHIPPING NEEDS BLOCK RELIEF TO EUROPE

The 3,700 vessels in the United Nations shipping pool are insufficient to transport across the Atlantic and Pacific all the goods requested by area commanders for military operations, let alone relief goods—whether these are destined for distribution by the Army, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, the local government or special committees. This acute shipping shortage explains to a considerable degree the statement by the Earl of Selborne, British Minister of Supply, in the House of Commons on December 15 that the food crisis in Europe has grown worse since D-Day (June 6). For much of its food Europe today depends on the Western Hemisphere, and ships are needed for this purpose.

**MILITARY PRESSURE ON SHIPPING.** United Nations ships are supplying two major fronts—on the Rhine and in the Philippines—as well as the military needs of the armies in Italy. They are hauling goods to ports of supply for the Soviet Union. The distance across the Pacific and the still limited number of ports in Western Europe keeps ships a long time on any one journey. Ships have waited as long as 20 to 40 days off the coast of France for unloading, but the recent opening of Antwerp is sure to reduce these delays. Many ships bound for Leyte leave from East Coast ports because the Pacific Coast lacks port facilities to handle all the vessels needed for supplying General MacArthur's armies in the Philippines; the round trip from the United States to Leyte averages 100 to 150 days, or about three trips a year for one ship.

The enemy understands the dependence of our military operations on shipping. The Japanese news agency, Domei, announced on December 15 that it is more important for the Japanese to sink "enemy transports and cargo ships" than battleships and carriers. The United Nations still suffer some losses to submarines. Although the 154 vessels completed in United States shipyards in November exceed by far the number of sinkings in this period, many ships are removed from transoceanic service by military requirements for short-haul vessels. Ships totaling more than 5,000,000 deadweight tons are making shuttle runs between England and the European continent, and between the Philippines and Pacific bases to the east and south.

The War Shipping Administration has notified

agencies sending relief supplies to Europe that it will try to get goods aboard ship if the agency gets them to dockside. Nevertheless, UNRRA has been unable to ship to Italy any materials in its \$50,000,000 program for mothers, children and displaced persons. Six shipments of relief materials for needy men, women and children in liberated Italy have left the United States under the auspices of American Relief for Italy; the first shipment, arriving in Italy early in December, included 1,000 tons of ready-made clothing, hospital supplies, and infants' food. Between the Allied landings in Sicily in 1943 and mid-September 1944 only 2,500,000 tons of relief goods reached Italy for distribution under military direction.

Opportunities for expanding the merchant fleet are limited. Negotiations going on in London probably will bring Swedish-flag ships into the United Nations pool, but not until the day war ends in Europe. The Swedish government, meanwhile, has offered the use of ships of Swedish registry for transportation of relief materials, and has proposed specifically that Swedish ships carry food to the occupied Netherlands as they have to Greece. The Allies have not accepted the Netherlands program, and it is doubted whether the Germans, blockading the entrance to the Baltic, would permit Swedish ships to emerge into the Atlantic for the purpose of carrying relief supplies to liberated areas behind Allied lines.

**RELIEF NEED GROWING.** Since the beginning of hostilities on December 7, 1941, United States policy has been to put conduct of the war ahead of every other question, political and humanitarian. But the coming of winter makes the relief problem so urgent that the Allied governments may decide to increase the shipping space assigned to relief goods headed abroad. Herbert H. Lehman, Director General of UNRRA, is expected to advocate this change before the Combined Shipping Board when he returns from Europe, where he has been consulting officials in Paris and London; and Richard K. Law, British Minister of State, has just arrived in Washington to discuss supply problems in liberated European territories. Hunger aggravates the discontent disturbing the political life of Belgium, Italy and Greece, and thereby threatens military communications.

BLAIR BOLLES

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